

U-2 / INTELL

Oct 60: AF plan to use SAC U-2s.

Not approved; instead, C/A.

Monthly; ^{in 61} except Jan, Feb, Aug, Nov (dark days)

Bay of Pigs) in 1961.

Monthly to bimonthly in 1962: periods of 2-30 days between flights.

Navy, JCS requested more frequent coverage.

Meanwhile, some concern at top levels ~~for~~ as to need for

frequent flights; decision at 12 July SG meeting

to reduce somewhat the frequency. 14 July: Halperin

requested review of peripheral Recon with a view to reducing their frequency as well. (APPARENTLY W.R.T. CUBAN PROTESTS. ?)

Recon began with

Navy overflights in early 60, controlled by CANT, for whole

community. Terminated by President in fall '60, when

C/A flights began. (27 Oct) Navy interest in threat to

G/THO; after Bay of Pigs, USAF interest in AOB and TAC's needs for

contingency planning & mission folders. Army: ^{drop your} _{ground defense}

3 in 1960; 17 in 1961 (8 in Bay of Pigs, 17-24 April)

5, 26, 29 Sep; 5, 7 Oct.

20 in 1962 till 7 Oct: (4 in June); 8, 12 July; 5, 29 Aug; 1

recon flights

In mid-July 62:

6-11

2

10

6-8

1-2

25-33 monthly + 20 special

Mar 62 : MRBM's, to "unlikely" (i.e. 3:1 against).

This "would not preclude" (what probe?)
(sign. for "possible?")

On COMOR, Service + DIA mps. pressed for
continued coverage; State under [under?] usually
disinclined in agreeing to any aggressive collection program,
CIA mp (Tidwell?) appeared to be taking a neutral position.

But hard to prove foot dragging, since no record
of footnoting or other type objections to military statistics
of recon needs.

(See Tidwell on period of 13-19 June, "planned
uprising")

1 pm: DIAXX: weekly recon of Cuba not justified.

CSG

See Brig. Gen. Craig, J-3 Caribbean Survey Group;
sensitive functions, known only to a few high-ranking
intell offs in military depts. Special Task Group.

DIAXX affs learned about 4 pm. As a result,
closer coord with Col. John Wright (CSG) regarding
recon objectives responsive to collateral reports emanating
from Comb. Intern. Center. Subsequently, Wright
worked closely with DIAXX and on two occasions special
TV coverage was arranged when it appeared Cuban
uprisings were anticipated.

Photos - direct evidence

S1 - indirect evidence

Problem of exploiting T coverage at secret level for
contingency plans, mission folders; sanitizing (e.g.
blowing up photos to a scale that could not be attributed
to ~~the~~ —.

- 2 Dec 56 Castro begins revolt
- 1 Jan 59 Castro gains power
- 15 Apr 59 Castro visits US
- 13 Feb 60 USSR aid pact, Mikoyan - Castro
(Mar 60)
- 29 Apr 60 Cuba seizes US property
- 21 Sep 60 Castro meets K
(Oct 60): T ops
- 3 Jan 61 US breaks relations
- 17 Apr 61 Bay of Pigs fails
- 3 Sep 62 Sorensen announces Cuban aid
- 13 Sep 62 JFK warns Cuba

(4 Sep not "warning")

SAC ops
no. senties

Oct 14

1

mon 15

2

(liaison est. between EK and Mary PIC.)

Tues 16

none

Wed 17

6

Thurs 18

2

Fri 19

3

Sat 20

3

Sun 21

none

Mon 22

3

Read for downgrading: on 18 Oct.

DIA briefed daily on buildup: SecDef, Dep Sec Def,
CJCS, JCS, JS; JRC, NRO, Nitze

COMOR Working Group met about once a month;
but 5 times between 28 Sep - 21 Oct. 62.

1 Feb 61: AF wanted special coverage to check collat.
reports of construction of rocket launching pads.

8 Sep 62 : DIA asks the mem of Barnes (high resolution:
1 foot on a side)

10 Sep Carter recommends it to McN, for SG.

24 Sep: S4O states need for high res., points out Finely
could partially fulfill.

2 Oct DIA in reply to SecDef memo of 1 Oct informs McN of
limitation on U-2s regards overflight of SA-2s.
COMOR had ^{forwarded to US/B} approved DIA just. for Finely.

3 Oct: S4O requests COMOR resumption of U-2 on over
a week basis.

5 Oct S4O draft of intell justif. ; forwarded by COMOR
to NRO on 6 Oct for presentation to SG on 9 Oct.
Discussed at US/B on 10 Oct.

10 Oct US/B agreed Chairman should tell SG winner

COMOR

1 Sep COMOR mtg review results of 29 Aug.

agreed

Conclusions: 1. In view of finding complexes on the western end of the island, it is particularly important that as soon as weather permits the next authorized mission should cover those areas of the island which were not photographed because of weather or because the range did not permit.

2. That the priority areas of interest should be the areas referenced in 1 above and to include other targets on a second priority basis which might require recoverage.

3. That the complex at the eastern end of the island should be photographed again, but there is no requirement at this time for recoverage of the complexes identified on Aug 29.

8 Sept. Reviewed results of 5 Sept. Unfortunately weather precluded photography of the possible Surface-to-Surface Missile Site at Banes on the eastern end of the island as well as a portion of the Phantom area. The mission ^{also} did not cover the Isle of Pines (to check on SAM deployment) and other areas in the eastern half of the island which should be searched for SAM and possible SSF deployment.

i. Recommends that another mission be flown as soon as weather permits to cover Banes and the other targets mentioned above and identified on attached map.

10 Sept: On 9 Sept the Chairman COMOR was informed by the Dir. I+R that SecState had raised a question whether the info needed on Banes could be obtained by peripheral means. COMOR met this morning to answer this question.

4C04

Some refugee reports of missiles had been highly specific in location (like Sept 20); - in our case, photos showed nothing.

CINCLANT to DIA on 17 May: (reports of missiles in Cuba for two years, all unconfirmed. No evidence of Sov A-weapons of any type en route to Cuba, nor of Sov intent.

it was " highly unlikely the USSR would select Cuba as the first country to obtain Sov atomic weapons, or that the USSR would place atomic weapons in a militarily vulnerable location such as Cuba."

No indications till July of intent to fortify Cuba.

(Would take 3-7 days to recall planes with the
adequate capability for this from the Baltic or Far East,
& interfere with their programs.

U-2 on optimum weather conditions, 7-15 mi. from target
could permit useful, if not conclusive, info w.r.t. Bases.

Peripheral photos could satisfy some of the objectives
planned for coverage in the current proposed mission:
i.e., those objectives on the north and south coasts and
some of the Isle of Pines. It could not satisfy
[Lilly?]
requirements in the Guantanamo area nor search which
may be required later for SAMs further inland nor for future
Mig-21 count on inland bases nor for technical intell which
may be required on already known or yet to be found missile
sites.

[Was "insight area" for 14th Oct Lilly?]

13 Sept: Claim. reported that as a result of high level discussion there was now approval for a long mission to cover the eastern end of the island, one to cover the Isle of Pines, and the third to be flown ^{solely} peripherally on either the northern or southern edge between the center of the island and the eastern end.

27 Sept: highest priority targets for TKH in Cuba + China as well as ~~Indochina~~ USSR. Secondary in Indonesia + Israel.

2 Oct DIA to McN Case McN m

2.

When decision taken? (final?)

② prob not before political conflict in Cuba resolved: late March. Prob by mid-May, considering time to marshal equipment for shipment, starting mid-July. 14 May: Sov aid increased; ^{in mid-May} Sov military aid to Indonesia delayed.

2-17 July: Paul Castro went to Moscow.

Cuba "like a linchpin in the belt of NATO bases surrounding the USSR." ^{officers} Havana 28-30 June; Adams in July.

(a "disparate plan" to locate an atomic base in Cuba"; feared invasion in July.

July: Officers: danger of US invasion will be over in September.

11 Aug. any attempt to land forces in Cuba would meet with disaster, because only...

[Wrong SNIE by Adams; illustration of provocativeness of weapons — esp. in deployment phase. Israeli attack, 1956. Sz of Pigs 1961.]

2 Sept: Cuban-Sov communique: why?

'right' to provide Cuba...

Volunteer calls starting Sept 14. (?)

25 Sept: Newsmen restricted to Havana.

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